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Daniel Barstow Magraw
I.	 Introduction
A.	 Background: Issues and Politicalization
International rivers exist in vast numbers
throughout the world. Well-known examples include the
Amazon, Amur, Colorado, Congo, Danube, Euphrates,
Indus, Jordan, Mekong, Nile, Rhine, and St. Lawrence
Rivers. These take the form either of rivers bordering
the territories of two or more States, called
"contiguous" rivers, or of rivers passing through the
territories of two or more States, called "successive"
rivers.
The allocation and use of the water in
international rivers give rise to many issues. One not
discussed in this paper concerns navigational uses.
Other questions, which are the subject of this paper,
involve the quantity and timing of flow, and water
quality, i.e., pollution. The vital economic, social,
and military importance of these questions, and the
fact that upstream and downstream States typically have
diametrically opposed interests with respect to them,
have led to frequent and often violent conflict
throughout history.
B. Summary of Developments
Each of the three sources of international law --
customary international law, general principles common
to the major legal systems of the world, and
international agreements -- affects the allocation of
international rivers.
Most authorities would agree that the major norms
of customary international law concerning the non-
navigational use of international rivers are the
principles of no harm and of equitable utilization.
According to the former principle, a riparian State
should utilize an international river so as not to
cause significant harm to other riparian States. What
constitutes significant harm, especially in a situation
of insufficient flow or where opportunity costs are at
issue, is not clear. According to the latter
principle, each State is entitled to a reasonable and
equitable use of an international watercourse. Whether
a particular apportionment is reasonable and equitable
is determined by weighing all the facts and
circumstances, including the history of prior use
Both principles thus suffer from ambiguity. And
substantial controversy exists regarding how they
interrelate, i.e., may a use significantly harm a
downstream State but nevertheless be equitable and thus
permissible?
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The principles of no harm and, to a lesser extent,
equitable realization are supported by the principle
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (one should
exercise one's rights so as not to injure another),
which is most probably a general principle of law
common to the major legal systems of the world (and
thus probably an international law norm). But this
principle also lacks specificity.
The principles referred to above apply globally.
It is also possible that customary norms exist that
apply only regionally, e.g., between Canada and the
United States.
Because the no-harm and equitable-utilization
principles (assuming they exist) came into existence
only over several centuries and because, in any event,
they are so vague, States have entered into well over
200 international agreements governing international
rivers. The United States is a party to watercourse
agreements with each of its neighbors -- Canada and
Mexico. Those relationships differ, both substantively
and procedurally. The agreements have been used to set
rules and resolve disputes, most recently with respect
to the Cabin Coal Mine/Flathead River controversy
between the United States and Canada. The major
international-river dispute between the United States
and Mexico has concerned the Colorado River, a dispute
that may arise again if climate change occurs.
Because of the importance of international rivers
and because of the controversy and ambiguity
surrounding customary international law and general
principles as applied to international rivers, the
United Nations International Law Commission is now
studying this topic. Its work, which is meant to
complement, not supplant, more specific treaty regimes
covering particular international rivers, recognizes
the no-harm and equitable-utilization principles and a
duty to cooperate; and it specifies procedures for
prior consultation. The Commission's work will almost
certainly help clarify and develop the law.
C.	 General References
1. J.G. Lammers, Pollution of International 
Watercourses (1984).
2. Management of International Water
Resources: Institutional and Legal 
Aspects, Natural Resources/Water Series
No. 1, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/5 (1975).
3. McCaffrey, The Fortieth Session of the 
International Law Commission, 83 Am. J.
Int'l L. 153, 160-66 (1989).
4. Schwebel, Third Report on the Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348
(1981), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
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Comm'n 65, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 1) (1984).
5.	 The Law of International Drainage Basins 
(A. Garretson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead
eds. 1967).
II. Existing International Legal Regime
A.	 Introduction
The international legal system differs from
typical domestic legal systems in three fundamental
respects. First, there is no authoritative law-making
institution, i.e., no centralized legislative
authority. Second, there is no dispute-settlement
mechanism with mandatory jurisdiction, i.e., no binding
adjudicatory authority. And third, there is no
centralized enforcement body: the U.N. Security
Council has enforcement powers if the dispute threatens
the peace, but the exercise of that authority is
effectively blocked by the veto power of the five
permanent members.
As a result, determining the proper allocation and
use of international rivers -- questions that usually
pit one sovereign State (i.e., nation) against another
-- is more difficult than river allocation is within a
country. Often, it is not clear whether there exists a
relevant rule of law about a particular use and, if oner	
does exist, what it means. Moreover, absent the
agreement of all States party to a dispute about a
river, there is no body to apply existing law to the
facts, or even to determine the facts. And finally,
there is no body to enforce a determination that
international law requires a certain remedy, even if
such a determination can be gotten. In spite of these
barriers, however, international law usually is
followed -- both in general and in particular about
international rivers.
Each of the three sources of international law is
relevant to international rivers. Those sources are:
(1) customary international law, i.e., general and
consistent State practice, done in the belief that such
practice was required or permitted by international law
(State practice plus opinio iuris); (2) general
principles common to the major legal systems of the
world; and (3) international agreements, i.e.,
agreements (whether called treaties, conventions,
accords, or any other name) among two or more States
that establish legal obligations or rights.
B.	 Customary International Law
1.	 Principle of no harm
Probably the most widely recognized customary
norm concerning international rivers is the principle
that no riparian State, through the use of the
international river, may cause significant (or
"substantial" or "appreciable") harm to another
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riparian State. This principle is a particular
application of the more general rule, expressed in the
Corfu Channel case ((U.K. v. Albania) Merits, 1949
I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22-23 (Judgment of April 9)), of "every
State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States."
The no-harm principle, though relatively well-
established, is often unclear in its application. For
example, what constitutes harm: must persons or
property be damaged, or will injury to the environment
suffice? Also, what level of harm must occur or be
threatened before a State's responsibility is engaged?
Particular uncertainty arises where quantity or quality
are already impaired or where one State alleges an
opportunity cost rather than a harm to an existing
beneficial use.
2.	 Principle of equitable utilization
Most authorities would agree with the existence of
this principle, which provides that "each State is
entitled to a reasonable and equitable share of the
beneficial use of the waters of an international
watercourse." J.G. Lammers, supra, at 364. Whether a
particular apportionment is reasonable and equitable is
determined by weighing all the facts and circumstances,
including the history of prior use. This approach
provides desirable flexibility, in particular in
balancing the right of a sovereign (riparian) State to
act as it likes in its own territory and the
corresponding duty not to interfere with another
sovereign (riparian) State's ability and right to act
as it likes in its own territory. But those advantages
are offset, at least to some degree, by the principle's
ambiguity: what is a reasonable and equitable use?
That ambiguity is particularly problematic in the
international sphere because of the typical lack of a
judicial or arbitral authority with mandatory
jurisdiction, or of an institution with river-
management authority.
3. Duty to cooperate and negotiate
The principle of equitable utilization is
reinforced by one aspect of the duty to cooperate,
i.e., the upstream State's duty to negotiate with a
downstream State that will be disadvantaged by a
proposed use. But that duty also is vague and often
indeterminable. (See, e.a., Lake Lanoux arbitral award
(France v. Spain), [1957] I.L.R. 101, 140-41.)
4. Relation between no-harm and equitable-
utilization principles
Many authorities who recognize the principles
of no harm and equitable utilization are troubled by
the relation between them. Suppose a proposed use that
is "reasonable and equitable" would harm another
riparian State: should it be permitted? Some argue
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that the fundamental principles of sovereignty and
equality of States indicates that the use should be
allowed, because otherwise one State is able to stop a
"reasonable and equitable" activity of another State in
its own territory. Others respond that that solution
would result, in the absence of a binding international
rule-making or dispute-settlement mechanism, in a
winning advantage to the stronger State; that typically
the States involved do not have equal power; and that
the no-harm principle must therefore prevail, also
based on an appeal to the principle of sovereign
equality of States.
S.	 Regional customary international law
The principles discussed above apply
globally. It is also possible that regional customary
norms exist regarding an international river, i.e.,
customary norms that would apply only to two or a few
riparian States. I know of no studies on that question
as applied to river allocation and use. One could
easily imagine that such norms might exist between
Canada and the United States or between Mexico and the
United States, based on their extensive cooperation in
the fields of natural resource management and
protection generally or of international rivers
specifically. Professor Toru Iwama of Fukuoka
University, Fukuoka, Japan, is researching the former
possibility. For lists of specific behavior relevant
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to that possibility for the United States, Canada, and
Mexico, see Magraw, International Law and Park 
Protection: A Global Responsibility, 143, 160-61, in
Our Common Lands: Defending the National Parks (D.J.
Simon ed. 1988).
C. General Principles Common to the Major Legal
Systems of the World
These "general principles" are recognized as
sources of international law by the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
§ 102(1)(c) (1987) and in the International Court of
Justice, I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1)(c). The general
principle most relevant to the allocation and use of
international rivers is sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (the duty to exercise one's rights in ways that
do not harm the interests of other subjects of law).
This principle, which is related to the doctrine of
abuse of rights, is the source of a State's duty not to
interfere with the flow of a river to the detriment of
other riparian States. (See, e.g., I L. Oppenheim,
International Law: A Treatise 346 (8th ed., H.
Lauterpacht ed. 1955). The principle is subject to
varying application in a particular situation because,
for example, of disagreement about the scope of State's




Because of the large number of international
rivers, because the principles referred to above
developed only slowly over time, and because of the
vagueness of those principles, well over 200
international agreements are in effect that govern the
allocation and use of international rivers. (See
Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the 
Utilization of International Rivers for Other Purposes 
than Navigation (U.N. Publication Sales No. 63.V.4).)
The earliest such agreement of which I am aware was
entered into in 805. For a 1754 Venice treaty, see XI
International Protection of the Environment -- Treaties 
and Related Documents (B. Ruster & B. Simma, eds.
1975). Most of these agreements are bilateral, such as
that between Finland and the Soviet Union. (United
Nations, 379 Treaty Series 330.) Some are regional,
such as that governing the Rhine River. When such an
agreement exists, it can provide more specificity
regarding substantive rights and procedural mechanisms
than do the customary norms and general principles
referred to above.
2. United States
The United States has international
agreements with both of its immediate neighbors
creating regimes regarding international rivers.
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a.	 Canada-United States
Canada and the United States have a
relatively long and generally successful history of
dealing with natural-resource disputes, including those
regarding the allocation and use of international
rivers. This relationship, in fact, is probably the
most successful example of bilateral environmental
cooperation in the world (in spite of the current
controversy about acid deposition).
In 1909 the United States and Great Britain (on
behalf of Canada) entered into the Boundary Waters
Treaty. (Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-
Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.) That
treaty establishes certain obligations with respect to
boundary waters and also provides a binational
mechanism -- the International Joint Commission ("IJC")
-- for helping resolve boundary-water disputes.
Notably, Article IV of the Treaty provides: "It is
further agreed that the waters herein defined as
boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary
shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of
health or property on the other." That language, which
is (probably unrealistically) absolute and unyielding
on its face, is nowhere in the Treaty defined more
precisely, and there does not appear to be any detailed
analysis of the terms "polluted," "injury," "health,"
and "property." The force of Article IV might be
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reduced considerably by the inclusion of a provision
akin to the "Harmon Doctrine" -- i.e., that a nation
has the unqualified sovereign right to utilize and
dispose of the waters of an international river flowing
through its territory -- in Article II of the Treaty.
But the United States has never actually asserted that
doctrine -- in connection with the Treaty or in any
other context. And Canada also has not insisted on a
strict interpretation of Article II.
The IJC, which is composed of three members from
each nation, is a quasi-judicial body with mandatory
jurisdiction and binding authority to approve or
disapprove the quantitative -- but not the qualitative
-- aspects of projects such as boundary-water
diversions or obstructions. In addition, the Treaty
provides that the nations jointly may refer
environmental matters to the IJC for its binding or
nonbinding recommendation (Articles IX & X). No
disputes have been referred for the former, but more
than 100 disputes have been sent to the IJC for
nonbinding consideration. The IJC's recommendations
normally have been followed in spirit, thus resolving
difficult disputes in an amicable and timely manner.
The IJC typically proceeds by forming an advisory
board composed of equal numbers of technical experts
from each nation. The board is directed to investigate
and report on the factual basis of the dispute. Making
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policy recommendations normally is not part of the
board's mandate. Nevertheless, the board's findings
(which usually are unanimously endorsed by the board)
have frequently eliminated much of the controversy, by
removing factual misunderstandings or disagreements
that had interfered with developing bilateral
consensus.
Pollution of the Great Lakes presented an issue
too large for the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. Two
subsequent treaties, in 1972 and 1978, established a
regime to control that problem -- one of great
significance to both nations and to which both nations
contributed. (Agreement Relating to the Establishment
of a Canada-United States Committee on Water Quality,
Sept. 21, 1972, United States-Canada, 23 U.S.T. 2813,
T.I.A.S. No. 7470; Agreement on Great Lakes Water
Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T.
1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257.) That regime, which utilizes
the IJC, has worked well since its inception. For a
discussion of the Great Lakes management system, see
National Research Council of the United States & Royal
Society of Canada, The Great Lakes Water Ouality
Agreement: An Evolving Instrument for Ecosystem
Management (National Academy Press 1985).
b.	 Mexico-United States
In 1944, Mexico and the United States
entered into a treaty dealing with three international
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rivers -- Colorado, Tijuana, Rio Grande -- and
establishing the International Boundary Waters
Commission ("IBWC") to plan, build, and manage border
water works, to enter into further agreements regarding
international waters, and to settle disputes regarding
interpretation of the Treaty if both parties consent.
(See Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande,
Feb. 3, 1944, Mex.-U.S., 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994, 3
U.N.T.S. 313.) (The IBWC replaced the International
Boundary Commission, which was created by treaty in
1889 to settle boundary demarcation disputes. See
Convention Between the United States and Mexico, March
1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512, U.S.T.S. 232, 9 Sevens 877.)
The IBWC has been quite active. Several problems
currently exist in connection with international rivers
or watercourse basins, including the threat that
increased Mexican irrigation will harm Organ Pipe
Cactus National Monument in Arizona by lowering the
groundwater table there. (See U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, Nat'l Park Service, Organ Pipe National 
Monument Natural and Cultural Resource Management Plan 
55-68 (1983).)
The regime governing the Colorado River has
developed significantly since 1944. Article 10 of the
1944 Treaty guarantees Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet of
Colorado River water per year, with two provisions:
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(1) the United States will deliver up to an additional
1.7 million acre-feet whenever flows exceed all U.S.
uses plus the 1.5 million acre-feet due Mexico; and
(2) deliveries to Mexico may be reduced in proportion
to consumptive uses in the United States in case of
drought or damage to U.S. irrigation systems.
The Treaty ignores groundwater use. The Treaty
also does not mention water quality, an omission that
created difficulties as U.S. uses drove the salinity of
the water delivered to Mexico ever higher. From 1950-
1960, the salinity of the Colorado River ranged from
700 parts per million (ppm) to 920 ppm. Salinity
jumped to 1,340 ppm in 1961 as the result of the
filling of Lake Powell and other activities. Mexico
formally protested in November 1961, alleging
violations of the Treaty and of customary international
law. Mexico was unable to use the water after 1961 and
let it flow unused into the Gulf of Mexico.
After initial denials by the United States, the
IBWC gradually became the focal point of negotiations
by the two countries. Several interim measures were
tried unsuccessfully. Finally, in 1973, the United
States agreed not to supply Mexico with water with
salinity concentrations more than 115 ppm over the
concentrations delivered to the Imperial Dam in
California. Both countries also agreed to limit
groundwater pumping within five miles of the border to
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160,000 acre-feet per year. (IBWC Minute No. 242,
Permanent and Definitive solution to the International
Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, Aug. 30,
1973, 69 Dep't State Bull. 395 (1973), reprinted in 12
I.L.M. 1105 (1973); Agreement on Colorado River
Salinity Confirming Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973,
United States-Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No.
7408.)
The United States Congress passed implementing
legislation the next year. That legislation provided,
inter alia, for building a mammoth desalinization plant
at Yuma, Arizona and lining the Coachella Canal in
California to save water to use toward satisfying the
U.S. Treaty obligation. (Colorado River Salinity
Control Act of 1974, 43 U.S.C. S 1591.)
III. Recent Developments
A.	 The United Nations International Law
Commission
Because of the importance of international rivers
and because of the lack of certainty regarding the
relevant international norms generally applicable to
those watercourses, the United Nations International
Law Commission ("Commission" or "ILC") undertook a
study of "The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses" in 1974, after prodding
from the U.N. General Assembly. The goals, generally
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speaking, were to codify and develop international law
in this area.
The international-watercourse topic proved to be
highly political, probably the most political topic
that the Commission has undertaken. The intense
difference in views arose, of course, because of the
strongly conflicting interests of upstream and
downstream States. Progress has also been hampered by
the need to appoint a series of special rapporteurs to
guide the study: Richard Kearny, 1974-76 (U.S.);
Stephen Schwebel, 1977-81 (U.S.); Jens Evensen, 1982-84
(Norway); and Stephen McCaffrey, 1985-present (U.S.).
The fact that three of the four special rapporteurs
have been from the United States is due to the United
States' being fairly equally an upstream State and a
downstream State.
Generally speaking, the Commission has adopted a
framework-agreement approach, i.e., an overarching set
of general legal principles that may be supplemented or
even supplanted by regional (or bilateral) agreements
designed to fit the particular characteristics of the
river (or a relevant part of it). A continuing debate
has concerned how comprehensively to define the scope
of the topic: should it relate only to the water in
contiguous and successive rivers, or should it include
all the hydrologic components such as groundwater? In
1980, the Commission agreed to set aside that
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controversy for a later time -- an agreement it still
honors -- by using the ambiguous term "watercourse
[system]" in its draft provisions.
The Commission has provisionally adopted 20
articles. Most significantly, two of these contain the
equitable-utilization and no-harm principles discussed
above (parts II.B.1 & 2):
Article 6 
Equitable and reasonable utilization 
and participation 
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective
territories utilize an international watercourse
[system] in an equitable and reasonable manner.
In particular, an international watercourse
[system] shall be used and developed by water-
course States with a view to attaining optimum
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom
consistent with adequate protection of the
international watercourse [system].
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the
use, development and protection of an interna-
tional watercourse [system] in an equitable and
reasonable manner. Such participation includes
both the right to utilize the international
watercourse [system] as provided in paragraph 1 of
this article and the duty to cooperate in the
protection and development thereof, as provided in
article . . .
Article 8 
Obligation not to cause appreciable harm
Watercourse States shall utilize an interna-
tional watercourse [system] in such a way as not
to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse
States.
(Report of the International Law Commission on the Work
of its Fortieth Session, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10)
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(1988), U.N. Doc. A/43/10; McCaffrey, The Fortieth 
Session of the International Law Commission, 83 Am. J.
Int'l L. 153 (1989).)
These principles had already been recognized by
many authorities, including the International Law
Association in its pioneering work. (See International
Law Association, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters 
of International Rivers, in Report of the 52nd
Conference of the International Law Association, Aug.
14-20, 1966 (1967), reprinted in The Law of 
International Drainage Basins 779 (A. Garretson, R.
Hayton & C. Olmstead, eds. 1967).) Their recognition
by the Commission will reinforce their position as
customary international law.
The Commission discussed the relationship between
those two provisions. The Commission concluded that,
at least prima facie, a use causing appreciable harm to
another State is not equitable. The Commission further
recognized, however, that if an equitable use does
result in appreciable harm to a downstream State, the
affected States should specifically agree to an
accommodation. (See McCaffrey, supra, at 164.)
The Commission also provisionally adopted several
other notable provisions, concerning the duty to
cooperate, the duty to exchange data and information on
a regular basis, and procedural rules applicable when a
State plans measures that may have adverse effects
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(including pollution) on other riparian States. (See
id. at 161-63.) Finally, the Commission will be
considering three articles dealing specifically with
environmental protection, pollution, and environmental
emergencies at its upcoming sessions.
The Commission's drafts are not binding
international law per se. But they are strong evidence
of international law and presumably will be
incorporated in some fashion later in an international
convention. The Commission's work in this area thus is
of great significance. Its work on the related topic
of International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law
is also relevant.
B.	 The Cabin Creek Coal Mine Dispute
As indicated above (part II.D.2.a), the 1909
Boundary Water Treaty between Canada and the United
States established a body -- the International Joint
Commission ("IJC") -- to help resolve boundary-water
disputes.
The most recent controversy to be considered by
the IJC involved a proposed coal mine on Cabin Creek,
British Columbia. The United States argued that the
coal mine would pollute the North Fork of the Flathead
River, killing fish, harming the recreational value of
the area, and causing other damage. The dispute is
especially troublesome because eastern British Columbia
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is not very developed economically and because the
North Fork of the Flathead River constitutes the
western boundary of Glacier National Park.
The dispute was referred to the IJC for nonbinding
resolution in December 1984 (U.S.) and February 1985
(Canada). The IJC appointed an advisory board, which
engaged in a fact-finding inquiry of the type described
above and submitted a series of reports during the
period 1986-1988.
In December 1988, the IJC adopted the report of
the fact-finding board. The IJC concluded, inter alia,
that the Cabin Creek Coal Mine should not be approved
as proposed, in order to protect the use of the
Flathead River. The IJC's recommendations are as
follows.
The Commission recommends that, in order that
Governments can ensure that the provisions of
Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty are
honoured in the matter of the proposed coal mine
at Cabin Creek in British Columbia:
(1) the mine proposal as presently defined and
understood not be approved;
(2) the mine proposal not receive regulatory
approval in the future unless and until it
can be demonstrated that:
(a) the potential transboundary impacts
identified in the report of the Flathead
River International Study Board have
been determined with reasonable
certainty and would constitute a level
of risk acceptable to both Governments;
and,
(b) the potential impacts on the sport fish
populations and habitat in the Flathead
River system would not occur or could be
22
fully mitigated in an effective and
assured manner; and,
(3) the Governments consider, with the appro-
priate jurisdictions, opportunities for
defining and implementing compatible,
equitable and sustainable development
activities and management strategies in the
upper Flathead River basin.
(International Joint Commission (Can.-U.S.), Impacts of 
a Proposed Coal Mine in the Flathead River Basin 11
(Dec. 1988).)
These recommendations are notable in several
respects. They are based in part on international
programs other than the Treaty: Glacier National Park
has been nominated by the United States as a World
Heritage Site pursuant to the World Heritage Convention
(to which both Canada and the United States are
parties), and Glacier National Park and the adjoining
Waterton Lakes National Park in Canada operate joint
activities as part of the UNESCO's Man and the
Biosphere program. (See id. at 6, 19, 25.)
Recommendation (3) is also interesting, with its
recommendation of a joint management regime for the
river basin -- an idea that hopefully will become a
reality in an increasing number of river basins.
The IJC's recommendations are not binding, so the
ultimate resolution of the Cabin Creek dispute is up to
the political branches of the two governments. But
there is no reason to think that the IJC's conclusions
will be disregarded in this instance.
23
Many commentators, including myself, advocate
giving the IJC mandatory jurisdiction to make binding
judgments about allocation and use issues or otherwise
strengthening the IJC. Nevertheless, even as it
currently stands, the IJC offers a relatively effective
means of resolving issues regarding the allocation and
use of international rivers.
24
